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Abstract 
 Ken Arrow (1998) asks, “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” He replies – entirely correctly – 
that racial “segregation within an industry – that is, firms with either all black or all white labor forces” – may be explained by 
economic theory, but “the hypothesis of employer discrimination does not at all explain segregation by occupation, [and] 
discriminatory tastes of other employees … may explain segregation [by firms] within industries but not segregation by 
occupation[s]” (p. 95), that are filled by racially distinct persons within firms. Becker (1957) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000 and 
2010) offer economic theories that deal with social identity differentiation, but these lack rational choice theory foundations, 
insofar as they impose a utility indicator function as a primitive concept via persuasion, rather than such a function being entailed 
by derivation from a preference ranking relation defined on a set of outcomes, with restrictions imposed both on the set and the 
relation. This is a methodological weakness of their work relative to that of Arrow and Debreu (1954). 
A more serious difficulty with these contributions is that they ascribe a utility function to each individual in an 
economy, but I prove that assigning to individuals binary preferences, with or without their numerical representation as utility 
indicator functions, entails the impossibility of interpersonal social-identity diversification, rendering all persons in society 
indistinguishable by identity. The information necessary to identify a person‟s social identity is stripped off the model by the 
binariness restriction. A person in a binariness-salient model would simply not know against whom to discriminate. Economic 
theory is, therefore, endogenously color-blind, race-blind, gender-blind, ethnicity-blind, and in general, social-identity-blind. 
Everybody in the economy is White, or all persons are Black, or all female, or all Hispanics, and so on, but no two persons can 
endogenously have distinct social identities. This is also true of every player in a game, as in Nash (1951). 
However, if preferences are non-binary, interpersonal social identity diversification is possible, though their real-valued 
utility function representation is impossible. This begs the question as to what exact form preferences must take to support the 
specific utility function of Akerlof and Kranton, which also is non-traditional relative to the utility indicator function in Arrow 
and Debreu. 
As it happens, to exhibit diversity of persons by social identity, ascribing a utility function to a person is conceptually 
too restrictive. By substituting non-binary for binary preferences in the model of Arrow and Debreu, I extend their economic 
theory. The more general model I thus formulate has the following features: (i) there exists a social state in which all persons 
maximize their preferences on their feasible sets, (ii) endogenous interpersonal social-identity diversification characterizes this 
state of the economy, (iii) it is a free-market equilibrium without any state intervention, (iv) it is a Pareto optimal social state, and 
(v) a sizable proportion of Black workers are segregated into low-rank, low income jobs, whereas White workers in the same 
observable proficiency domain are placed in high-ranking, high-income jobs, thereby explaining occupational segregation within 
firms along a racial divide, which entails that (vi) income and wealth distributions vary by social identity. Thus free markets 
deliver a Pareto optimal state but it is fraught with remediable injustices. Further, my explanation meets standards Arrow sets for 
such a theory (see p. 21). (543 words) 
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1. Introduction 
Economics deals with commodities and people. In investigating phenomena pertaining to 
distinct social identities of persons, how does an economist tell the social identity of one person 
apart from that of another? That is, in economic models in the game theory and general 
equilibrium traditions of Nash (1951) and Arrow and Debreu (1954) respectively, how is a male 
distinguished from a female, black from white, Christian from Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and 
Buddhist, and so on. Well-defined boundaries that separate easily discernable groups of persons, 
where each distinct community is a partition of the human race, do, in fact, exist, at least in the 
minds of people. Moreover, all persons are affiliated with multiple communities, some by choice 
(economist versus a surgeon), though others by inexorable association (national origin). A 
person‟s affiliation with a community gives that person a mark of community or group identity, 
and a collection of his or her community markers defines a person‟s social identity. 
Telling apart the social identities of two persons in economic theory is a matter not 
typically discussed. This is because Nash deals with “players” rather than persons and Arrow and 
Debreu deal with “consumption units” rather than persons. Each consumption unit is defined 
exclusively by four characteristics: (a) an exogenously specified endowment vector of 
commodities, (b) an exogenously specified vector of fractional contractual claims over corporate 
profits of a finite number of “production units,” (c) a utility function that such a decision maker 
is assumed to maximize, and (d) a set of real vectors on which the utility function is defined. 
Each player is defined by a (i) a utility function defined on the pay-offs or outcomes of a game, 
(ii) a strategy set from which the player chooses a maximal strategy (not dominated by any 
strategy), and (iii) a correspondence that maps the player‟s strategy set to the set of pay-offs, 
which the player evaluates using the utility function, given all possible strategies that other 
players in the game can play. 
The utility function is, in turn, axiomatically derived from the logically primitive concept 
of an individual‟s preference ranking relation, with restrictions imposed both on the relation and 
on the set on which it is defined.
1
 Thus, a salient feature of this economic theory is that it has 
                                                 
1
Arrow and Debreu (1954, p. 268-269) write, “We assume the existence of a number of consumption units, typically 
families or individuals but including also institutional consumers. … The set of consumption vectors Xi available to 
individual i (=1, … , m) is a closed convex subset of    which is bounded from below; i.e., there is a vector  
 
     
for all        . … The choice by the consumer from a given set of alternative consumption vectors is supposed to 
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solid rational choice theory foundations, insofar as the utility function is derived from the 
logically more-primitive concept of a preference ranking relation. 
If a consumption unit in Arrow and Debreu is interpreted as a person, then the ith person 
is defined by ⟨𝜁 ,  𝛼    ,  𝑅 ⟩, where    is the closed convex set of commodity-consumption real 
vectors bounded from below, and on this set is defined 𝑅  a ranking relation of weak preference 
that stands for “at least as good as”, 𝜁  is the person‟s commodity endowment vector that is 
bounded from below, and 𝛼  is the vector the person‟s fractional claims to profits in some of the 
n firms in the economy. If a consumption unit is construed to be a person, then two persons can 
be distinct only in terms of these four characteristics, and nothing else whatever, precisely 
because Arrow and Debreu specify no other characteristics of an individual. Since race, ethnicity 
or gender do not form any part of the four characteristics that define a person, it should not come 
as a surprise that economic theory cannot distinguish among persons on the basis of their distinct 
races, ethnicities or genders, or more broadly by their distinct social identities. If there are any 
interpersonal social identity distinctions, they are exogenously imposed by the theorist on 
persons who are otherwise endogenously homogenous in terms of social identity. Economic 
theory is, therefore, endogenously color-blind, race-blind, gender-blind, ethnicity-blind, and in 
general, social-identity-blind.
 
Everybody in the economy is White, or all persons are Black, or all 
female, or all Hispanics, or everyone has identical social status, and so on, but no two persons 
can endogenously have distinct social identities.
2
 Such narrowness in the very definition of a 
player characterizes game-theoretic economic models as well.
3
 
In fact, in the context of sum-ranking utilitarianism, Sen and Williams (1982, p.4) claim 
that “persons do not count as individuals in this any more than individual petrol tanks do in an 
analysis of the national consumption of petroleum.” Their metaphor of “individual petrol tanks” 
                                                                                                                                                             
be made in accordance with a preference scale for which there is a utility indicator function        such that 
            
   if and only if    is preferred to indifferent to   
  by individual i.” 
Further, they assume that        is a continuous, real-valued numerical representation of a preference relation 𝑅  of 
individual i that stands for “at least as good as”. They also assume that (i) 𝑅  is a binary ranking relation defined on a 
compact and convex set   , and it is (ii) reflexive, (iii) transitive, (iv) complete, (v) continuous, (vii) convex, (vi) and 
satisfies non-satiation.  
Arrow and Debreu (p. 270) go on to say, “We also assume that the ith consumption unit is endowed with a vector 𝜁  
of initial holdings of different types of commodities available and a contractual claim to the share 𝛼   of the profit of 
the j
th
 production unit for each j.” They add, 𝜁   
          ,    𝜁  ;    ,  , 𝛼        , ∑ 𝛼  
 
     . 
2
 In the next section, I present a formal argument to support this elementary claim. 
3
 The game called Battle of the Sexes is also, by this reasoning, a misnomer.  
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is intended to highlight how very narrowly a person is defined in economic theory, contrasted 
with the reality of a person‟s varied, multiple, communally-shared marks of identification, as 
well as individually-unique distinctive traits.  
If my argument is valid, it should be impossible for theories based on Arrow and Debreu 
or on Nash to explain social-identity based discrimination of any sort, including occupational 
segregation by race or gender. This is simply because a person would not know against whom to 
discriminate, when every person is a race-less, gender-less replica of every other person, each 
utterly indistinguishable from every other on the basis of distinct social identities. I shall argue 
that this lack of distinguishability by social identity between two persons is an entailment of the 
binariness restriction that is almost always imposed on each person‟s ranking relation of weak 
preference in game theory, social choice theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of 
game-forms.    
In the context of racial discrimination in the United States, Arrow (1998, p. 94-95) 
directly asks, “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” He restrains himself 
from offering a theory, and though his objections are distinct from the one I have just outlined, 
his critique is most helpful in that it gets to the heart of the matter of what landmines to avoid in 
developing a credible theory of discrimination, 
Most analysts, following Becker (1957), add to the usual list of commodities some special disutility which 
Whites attach to contact with Blacks, taste-based discrimination. … The trouble with these explanations is 
that they contradict in a direct way the usual view of employers as simple profit-maximizers. While they do 
not contradict rational choice theory, they undermine it by introducing an additional variable. 
There are at least two objections to this line of analysis. One is that introducing new variables easily 
risks turning the "explanation" into a tautology. …and it certainly would be a parody of economics   to 
multiply entities in this anti-Occamian fashion. Perhaps more serious is the neglect of Darwinian principles. 
Arrow‟s objections to existing theories of discrimination thus are that: (i) “they contradict 
in a direct way the usual view of employers as simple profit-maximizers,” (ii) “while they do not 
contradict rational choice theory, they undermine it,” (iii) “introducing new variables easily risks 
turning the "explanation" into a tautology,” and (iv) “the neglect of Darwinian principles.” 
Specifically, if Darwinian principles are respected by a theory, according to Arrow (p. 95), 
the hypothesis of employer discrimination does not at all explain segregation by occupation, [and] 
discriminatory tastes of other employees … may explain segregation [by firms] within industries but not 
segregation by occupation[s] 
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that are filled by persons of distinct social identities within firms.
4
 Arrow argues that 
“segregation within an industry – that is, firms with either all black or all white labor forces,” 
rather than racially segregated occupations within a firm, is all that these theories can explain.
5
  
Discrimination, which stands in sharp contrast to meritocracy, is utterly repugnant to 
those who lead examined lives, in addition, of course, to being hideously painful to those who 
are at the receiving end of it; it is seen as an injustice.
6
 Despite its shortcomings,
7
 the moral 
principle that people should be rewarded for the instrumental value of their merit in achieving 
pre-specified, transparent goals trumps the alternative that persons should instead be rewarded 
based on their religion, ethnicity, gender, age, race, tribal affiliation, nationality, not being 
autistic, or being the relative of the president of a country, and the like. And the claim that 
insofar as markets exhibit impersonal transactions, they foster meritocracy in practice, 
constitutes an ideological basis of jettisoning state intervention in favour of unrestrained 
operation of markets. But reality is different. Arrow (1998, p. 93) also points out that,   
We have clear evidence that Blacks were in the past excluded from a significant range of jobs and from 
purchase of housing and restaurant services. We have very strong evidence that these practices persist in 
some important measure. I … suggest … that market-based explanations will tend to predict that racial 
discrimination will be eliminated. Since they are not, we must seek elsewhere for non-market factors 
influencing economic behavior. The concepts of direct social interaction and networks seem to be good 
places to start.
8
 
Thus if unregulated markets have supported in the past, for over two centuries, and 
continue to support today, a persistent stationary state characterized by the unambiguous 
injustice of racial discrimination in the United States that Arrow points to, some shine wears off 
the claim that free markets support meritocracy in practice, unless the indefensible claim is made 
that any such injustice is driven by state intervention itself.
9
 This diagnosis shakes up the 
ideological foundations against state intervention. Perhaps that is why some of the finest minds 
                                                 
4
 My goal in this paper is to provide a theory of discrimination that is bereft of all of Arrow‟s fundamental 
objections but one that I claim is necessary. 
5
 See Arrow (1998, p.95). 
6
 My objection to the discrimination literature in economics is distinct from Arrow‟s, insofar as for discrimination to 
be possible at least two social identities must exist – along lines that are racial, ethnic, gender, or whatever, which is 
impossible, I argue, in the model of Arrow and Debreu. However, Arrows suggestions for a credible theory of 
discrimination are still relevant independently of my argument. 
7
 On shortcomings of meritocracy, see Sen (1999), in a delightful set of essays by Arrow et al. (1999). 
8
 Italics added. 
9
 This was, in fact, the case before the abolition of slavery, but after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became the law of 
the land, it would be false to claim that state intervention supports racial or gender discrimination. Instead it combats 
such practices by imposing hefty fines. However, the banking firm of Well Fargo settled a dispute, by paying $175 
million in 2012, in action brought against it by the Department of Justice of the U.S. government, for charging 
African Americans and Latinos higher interest rates or mortgages despite their credit-risk ratings comparable to their 
White clients. This is one persistent symptom of discrimination in the post-1964 United States.  
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in economics have dwelt on the pernicious phenomenon of discrimination by social-identity 
distinctions, though unfortunately unsuccessfully, both for the reasons Arrow gives and because 
of my claim of interpersonal homogeneity of social identity in economic theory.
10
 
Recent work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005, 2010) on Identity Economics 
contains extremely valuable insights. In their theory, social identity diversification characterises 
the population, so that they can explain phenomena involving operationally significant identity 
differentiation. Indeed, Akerlof and Kranton (2005, p. 13) argue – entirely correctly – that, 
The combination of identity, social category, norm and ideal allows parsimonious modeling of 
how utility functions change as people adopt different mental frames of themselves – that is, as they take on 
different possible identities. Economists have recently adapted from psychology the idea that utility 
depends upon how a situation is framed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Identity describes one special way 
in which people frame their situation. 
 
Their theory helps explain a variety of phenomena involving the self-perception of a person‟s 
identity, and, more importantly, phenomena that had thus far defied coherent economic 
explanation, such as the consequences of bringing about a change in that identity – in a 
classroom, or on joining a military academy, and the like. 
Parsimony is undoubtedly a feature of their methodological approach. However, in the 
theory of Akerlof and Kranton, a person‟s maximization of a non-traditional “utility function” 11 
as a logically primitive conception is imposed via persuasion, rather than entailed by derivation 
from a preference ranking relation defined on a set of outcomes, with restrictions imposed both 
on the set and the relation. This clearly constitutes a weakness of their theory contrasted with that 
of Arrow and Debreu, if judged by Arrowian standards.
12
 Thus Arrow‟s critique that “while they 
do not contradict rational choice theory, they undermine it” still applies to the contribution of 
Akerlof and Kranton. 
If they could derive their utility function from underlying preferences, they would meet 
this specific standard of rigor in economic theory that Arrow demands. I claim, however, that 
they cannot do so, because the necessary underlying preference ranking relations that can support 
                                                 
10
 See Akerlof (1976), Becker (1957), Phelps (1972), Spence (1974), and Stiglitz (1974), among others. 
11
 Their utility function is nontraditional compared with one the standardly employed in economic theory, as in 
Arrow and Debreu. Akerlof and Kranton (2005, p. 14) specify    ,                  | 
      |,    
 ,  , as the utility function to be maximized by a worker as a primitive concept, “where U is the worker‟s utility, y 
is her income, e is her actual effort, c is her social category,    is her identity utility from being in category c, and 
  | 
      | is the disutility from diverging from the ideal effort level for category c, denoted      .” See Footnote 
2 for the specification of a utility function by Arrow and Debreu, to wit,       .  
12
 Arrow‟s standards for judging the credibility of a theory appear to endorse reasoning, preferably formal, in favor 
of persuasion or rhetoric. 
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their claims about identity distinctions of persons cannot be binary in character, and thus cannot 
be given any compatible numerical representation, let alone the one Akerlof and Kranton 
themselves specify as the utility function ascribed to a person. 
To provide rational choice theory foundations that are missing in Akerlof and Kranton‟s 
contributions, and to remove some deficiencies Arrow points to in the work of Becker and 
others, who also ascribe a utility function to each person in their explanations of discrimination, I 
suggest a non-binary personal preference approach in this paper. By substituting non-binary for 
binary preferences in the model of Arrow and Debreu, I extend their economic theory. The more 
general model I thus formulate has the following features: (i) there exists a social state in which 
all persons maximize their preferences on their feasible sets, (ii) endogenous interpersonal 
social-identity diversification characterizes this state of the economy, (iii) it is a free-market 
equilibrium without any state intervention, (iv) it is a Pareto optimal social state, and (v) a 
sizable proportion of Black workers are segregated into low-rank, low income jobs, whereas 
White workers in the same observable proficiency domain are placed in high-ranking, high-
income jobs, thereby explaining occupational segregation within firms along a racial divide, 
explaining thereby such a glaringly visible, rampant and persistent, though undoubtedly 
removable, injustice. 
Section 2 deals with the impossibility of endogenous interpersonal social-identity 
heterogeneity under binary personal preferences. Section 3 introduces a special kind of non-
binary personal preference relation. Section 4 is devoted to the extension of a few results in 
social choice theory in Sen (1970) to existence and Pareto optimality of a socially diverse social 
state with personal non-binary preference maximization of a quasi-ordered set. Section 5 uses the 
Basu (2006) approach to proving that in such a social state, although ex ante persons in a group 
are not dissimilar in the observable distribution of their profit-generating capability, they can 
nevertheless get segregated in the workplace ex post into distinct occupations based on their 
distinct social identities, even in profit-maximizing organizations. White Americans thus have 
high-rank, higher-paying jobs and African Americans in the same observable proficiency domain 
have low-rank, lower-paying jobs in the workplace. This arises if employers have racist 
conjectures about which race is more talented in producing a larger profit, and workers‟ talent is 
supermodular in shifting from one level to the next higher level. Section 6 contains some 
concluding remarks, particularly of a conceptual nature, but also the startling conclusion that 
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over one-and-a-half million African American Males are missing – they would have been alive 
today in the counterfactual circumstance that African American males are as numerous relative 
to African American females as white males are relative to white females in the United States.  
2. Impossibility of Endogenous Social Identity Diversification under Binariness 
The stage is now set to prove the first main result of this paper. 
Theorem 2.1: Binariness of personal preference ranking relations implies endogenous 
interpersonal social-identity heterogeneity is impossible. 
Proof: Recall that the ith person is defined by ⟨𝜁 ,  𝛼    ,  𝑅 ⟩ in the model of Arrow and Debreu. 
Add the assumption that 𝑅  is a binary ranking relation. 
Next consider two such distinct persons: John ↔ ⟨𝜁, 𝛼,  ,  R ⟩ and Katarina ↔
⟨𝜁, 𝛼,  ,  R ⟩. Then, John cannot be distinguished from Katarina ↔  R  R  . And,            
 R  R  ↔        &      & [ R   ↔   R  ] , which is true if, and only if, John and 
Katarina both identically rank every pair of alternatives in  . Thus „John and Katarina cannot be 
distinguished‟ implies, and is implied by, they „both rank every pair of alternatives identically.‟ 
It also follows from the definition of a person that John can be distinguished from 
Katarina ↔  R ≠ R  . But,  R ≠ R  ↔        &      &  R   & ~ R    , which is true 
if, and only if, there exists at least one pair of alternatives in   that is ranked differently under R  
than under R . Thus, „John can be distinguished from Katarina‟ implies, and is implied by „at 
least one pair of alternatives is ranked differently by John and Katarina.‟ 
It follows that the solitary basis of distinguishing between two persons is that they rank at 
least one pair of alternatives differently. John and Katarina are thus not distinguishable by social 
identity, because interpersonal distinctions are limited to being only in terms of distinct 
interpersonal rankings of at least a pair of alternatives, and nothing else. The concept of two 
socially distinct persons is itself not well-defined in a model of an economy with binary personal 
preferences. Hence endogenously every person in a binariness salient model of an economy has a 
single, solitary social identity. ■ 
Suppose John declares a red shirt to be at least as good as a blue shirt, and Katarina 
strictly prefers a blue shirt to red or is indecisive on the matter. Then, it is not altogether 
unreasonable to claim that they are distinguishable persons. However, solely on the basis of 
different rankings of blue and red shirts it would be patently absurd to conclude that one person 
is male and the other female, or one Black and the other White, or they have distinct social 
identities.
13
 
In essence, while in reality each person may have multiple dimensions, once a person is 
identified with a preference ranking relation and the property of binariness is imposed on this 
                                                 
13
 If a person is observed to be wearing a blue and red striped shirt as a matter of declared strict preference over 
either red or blue, would we conclude, solely on this basis, that it is a transgender person? In a binariness-salient 
model, exogenously imposing identity distinctions on persons who are, in fact, identity-wise homogenous is 
inadmissible. 
Naqvi Racial Segregation 
8 
 
relation, all personal dimensions other than the specific order of ranking of alternatives are 
rendered inadmissible information in the very conception of a person in such a model. Aside 
from distinct rankings of at least one pair of alternatives, interpersonal differences are rendered 
invariant to all other conceivable dimensions on which any two persons could have differed, 
including gender, race, ethnicity and the like. Two persons who differ exclusively in terms of 
ranking at least a pair of alternatives are certainly distinct and distinguishable, but they are 
distinguishable solely in this regard, not by any means in terms of having distinct social 
identities! 
3. Non-Binary Preferences 
 Thus, on the basis of Theorem 2.1, I argue that the binary preference ranking relation 
Arrow and Debreu ascribe to each consumption unit must be replaced by a non-binary personal 
preference ranking relation if the objective is to model social identity diversification in an 
economy.
14
 A ranking relation is non-binary in the Stig Kanger sense if, with a subscript 
referring to a person, 𝑅  is a binary ranking relation of weak preference defined on a set    of 
alternatives, and    is the background set of the i
th
 person or player upon which 𝑅  is dependent, 
so that 𝑅       defined on    is that person‟s non-binary ranking relation of weak preference, 
    ,  ,  &   . 
Note also that the personal feasible set    of mutually exclusive alternatives or strategies 
is very generally construed. However, in particular, it can also be taken to be the same set as a 
consumption unit‟s feasible set in Arrow and Debreu, without redefining the elements of a 
personal feasible set only of culmination outcomes, as in the set of payoffs in choice theory, 
game theory and in general equilibrium theory.
15
 Redefining the elements of the feasible set also 
                                                 
14
 See Sen (1994b) on his completion of the 1970s unfinished work “Choice based on Preference” of the late 
Swedish philosopher Stig Kanger on non-binary ranking relations and their corresponding maximal sets. 
15
 While I do not need it for the present exercise, for a richer formulation that would provide a formalization of 
culture, of which shared beliefs are a part, I could take the liberty of assuming that    is, in some cases, a set of 
alternative, mutually exclusive comprehensive outcomes (action-process-consequence strings) that in individual 
preferences attach positive constitutive value also to the process by which the choice of action leads to the final 
consequence, rather than ascribing direct, constitutive value only to the culmination outcomes, which is the case 
with game theory in Nash (1951) and in general equilibrium theory in Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Arrow and 
Hahn (1971), among others. 
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„easily risks turning the “explanation” into a tautology‟ according to Arrow (1998, p.95), and is 
thus an approach to be avoided.
16
 
In the case of a non-binary relation of weak personal preference 𝑅      defined on a set 
  , a variation in    (say, from   
  to   
   can, in general, alter a single person’s pair-wise ranking 
𝑅  of a pair of alternative actions  ,     , rendering 𝑅      a non-binary relation. This is 
because 𝑅 , which is by assumption a binary relation, is not invariant to tertiary considerations 
entailed by differences in the personal background set of any given person, such that    
 ≠
  
  &   𝑅    
    & ~ 𝑅    
    are both admissible.17 
Also, differences in the personal backgrounds of distinct persons can be accommodated 
by such a non-binary preference ranking relation. This is pure Kanger territory, as Sen (1994b) 
remarks. For example, 𝑅       could refer to the preference of the i
th
 person who is an African 
American male, and 𝑅       can represent a Caucasian male‟s preference, defined on     and 
   , respectively. While the gender of both persons is the same, a shared trait that they are both 
male, in such a non-binary model the persons are of different races. Thus, both shared and 
distinctive social identities of persons can also be accommodated in a model of a society with 
individual Kanger-Sen non-binary preferences. 
This is not the case in the Akerlof and Kranton theory of Identity economics. Instead, 
they deal with changing the mindset of a person i from the existing   
  before joining a military 
academy at West Point, to   
  after joining it and undergoing a change in self-perception, which 
changes the person‟s preference and consequently individual behavior. A change in a single 
person‟s belief of self-perception is a very different matter compared to two different persons 
having distinct identities. Such a crucial conceptual distinction gets lost in the utility function 
                                                 
16
 However, this is only one possible interpretation. There are other useful and important interpretations of both the 
elements of the feasible set as well as of the background set of which the ranking relation is a function. They could 
be utilized to explain intra-family interactions, for example. See Sen (1989). 
17
 It is perfectly legitimate to interpret   
 ≠   
  as two distinct menus faced by the same person. It is also legitimate 
to interpret them as distinct identities of the chooser (the host or I), which is crucial in the case of fiduciary 
responsibility, as Sen (1997) points out. Another interpretation is that different background sets constitutes a 
gateway that lets in information on the distinct social identities of different persons. The Akerlof and Kranton 
phenomenon can be interpreted as each member in a group of recruits into West Point has one back ground set of 
beliefs about oneself. However, training at the Academy changes their self-perception to a distinct characterization 
of oneself as a distinct background set. There can be many more interpretations. However, a numerical 
representation of such preferences is impossible in all cases. Also, it would not be legitimate to construe such 
preferences as state-contingent-probabilistic preferences, as, for example, in Karni (2005), in the theory of decision 
making under uncertainty, because there is no incompleteness of information in such a non-binary preference model.  
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specification of Akerlof and Kranton, but this substantive difference is sharply brought out by 
the Kanger-Sen non-binary preference formulation that I deal with here.  
Binary preferences are a special case of non-binary preferences, as R (  
 )  R   ̅  ≡ 
R ,   ,  . A utility function representation of preferences is, however, a casualty of switching 
from binary to more general non-binary preferences. 
To see this, assume that a person‟s preferences are represented by a non-binary relation 
𝑅     defined on the set S of mutually exclusive alternatives, where R is a binary relation 
defined on S and   is the background set on which R is dependent, with    ,  ,  . Suppose 
also that this person is identified with a utility function      , where S is the set of mutually 
exclusive alternatives and    is the set of real numbers. Then, by definition of a utility function, 
we have   ,     [ 𝑅(  ) ↔          ].18 Since 𝑅     is non-binary,                    
    ≠    &   ,      𝑅      & ~ 𝑅       are both admissible. Equivalently,         
 [         ]& ~[         ] ↔ [         ] & [         ], which is false. It 
follows that a non-binary preference relation cannot have a utility function representation. 
This exposes the fact that a non-binary ranking relation, which permits interpersonal 
social identity diversification, happens to be one that cannot possibly be given numerical 
representation that can legitimately be called a utility function. Since utility functions in Becker 
and in Akerlof and Kranton are presumably numerical representations of personal preferences, 
their methodological approaches are deeply problematic, though their conclusions need not be.  
Such a non-binary preference approach as outlined above can provide the rational choice 
theory foundation that Akerlof and Kranton‟s Identity Economics lacks. 
4. Non-Binary Personal Preference Relations based Society 
My purpose is to prove the existence of a non-empty set of social states at which all 
persons have achieved maximization of their respective personal non-binary preferences, which 
are required to be a quasi-ordering (reflexive and transitive, though not necessarily complete) of 
their respective personal feasible sets   .  
4.1 Model 
To develop the requisite theory, I make the following three assumptions. 
 
                                                 
18
 See Footnote 2. 
Naqvi Racial Segregation 
11 
 
Axiom N (Non-binariness Axiom): Each individual is characterized by a personal non-binary 
ranking relation of weak preference that is defined on a finite set of alternatives. This preference 
relation is 𝑅   
  , which is defined on a finite set    of the person‟s feasible set of alternatives, 
and    is that person‟s background set upon which the binary ranking relation 𝑅  is dependent, 
for all persons   from 1 to a finite m.  
Notice that non-binariness of personal preferences is defined in a very specific sense.
19
 
Axiom Q (Quasi-Ordering Axiom): Every person‟s non-binary relation of weak preference is 
reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. 
 
Axiom M (Maximization Axiom): Every person engages in a volitional act of choice by 
maximizing one‟s own personal preferences defined on the personal feasible set of actions. 
 
I shall prove that these three axioms collectively entail the following two claims: 
 
Condition S (Social Identity Diversification): There exists of a social state with endogenous 
social differentiation of persons, with each person being a social creature with multiple social 
identities deriving from affiliation with distinct, though overlapping communities (or subsets) of 
persons in society. 
 
Condition P (Pareto optimality): The social state identified in Condition S is Pareto optimal.  
 
The groundwork for an examination of a non-binary society with social diversification is 
now laid. Some additional formalization is necessary, however, for the demonstration of the next 
principal conclusion of this paper. 
 4.2. Formalization 
For a given set   
 
, let 𝑅    
   be person i‟s binary relation of weak preference that stands 
for “at least as good as”, which is defined on a finite set    of alternatives social states, and   
 
 is 
a background set on which the binary relation 𝑅  is dependent, with person    , , , and 
   ,  ,    specifying the possible parametric variations,   
 
, of person i‟s background set. 
Here,    is finite,      is finite, and    also finite with at least three elements. 
For 𝑅    
   , we can define the asymmetric part      
   that stands for “strict preference”, 
and the symmetric part      
   that stands for “indifference” as follows. 
Definition 1 STRICT PREFERENCE:    ,    &  ,       [[ 𝑅    
   ]& ~[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]] ↔ [   (  
 ) ] 
                                                 
19
 The precise content of the concept of non-binariness of preferences taken here, in Axiom N, is exactly the one 
formulated by Stig Kanger on which additional work was done by Sen (1994b), to complete Kanger‟s unfinished 
work, to bring it to the domain of mainstream choice theory. This is precisely the formulation of personal preference 
in Sen‟s (1997) individual choice theory.  
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Definition 2 INDIFFERENCE:    ,    &  ,       [[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]& [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]] ↔ [   (  
 ) ] . 
In this context, it is important to note that a variation in a tertiary consideration, viz., a 
parametric variation in the background set, can, in general, alter the order of personal preference 
insofar as    ,   ,      &   ≠    [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] & ~[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ], are both admissible, thereby 
rendering 𝑅    
   a non-binary relation. 
4.3. Existence of a Pareto Optimal State under Non-Binariness 
To achieve these objectives, I utilize three lemmas in Sen (1970), and with relatively 
minor generalizations, prove an existence theorem below. First, however, some additional 
definitions are in order. 
Definition 3: 𝑅 (  
 ) is reflexive over    if and only if    ,    &       [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] . 
Definition 4: 𝑅 (  
 ) is transitive over    if and only if the following holds: 
   ,    &   ,  ,       [[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]& [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]]  [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] .20 
Definition 5: A ranking relation that is reflexive and transitive is called a quasi-ordering.
21
 
Let   ⋃  ⋃   
   
   
 
    , and   ⋂   
 
   ≠   , and assume that S has at least three elements. 
Definition 6: A Non-Binary Collective Choice Rule (NB-CCR) is a functional relation f that 
assigns exactly one social ranking 𝑅  ,    of S to an inter-personal non-binary preference 
profile, (𝑅 (  
 ), , 𝑅 (  
 )) such that 𝑅  ,     (𝑅 (  
 ),  , 𝑅 (  
 )),  where 
  ,   𝑅 (  
 ) is a quasi-ordering of   .
22
  
                                                 
20
 Weaker forms of transitivity can be identified.    ,    &   ,  ,       [[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]& [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]]  [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] 
is less demanding because it requires of each person that transitivity hold over some variations,   , of a person‟s 
background set, though not necessarily over all variations. The first existence result I intend to prove also goes 
through, it is easy to see, on this weaker transitivity restriction on the social preference relation, and it does so also 
under acyclicity (of the strong kind), as in Berdillima and Naqvi (2011). 
21
 Reflexivity of 𝑅 (  
 ) is not a very demanding restriction. To see this, consider two persons, indexed m and f, 
where m is male and f is female. Then for all persons  ,     𝑅 (  
 )  and     𝑅 (  
 )  essentially means that both 
men and women regard an element of their feasible set at least as good as itself under all possible variations of their 
respective background sets, whether it rains or shines, for example. Similarly, for the transitivity property, 
    𝑅 (  
 )  &  𝑅 (  
 )   𝑅 (  
 )  and     𝑅 (  
 )  &  𝑅 (  
 )   𝑅 (  
 ) means that both men and 
women have transitive preferences for all variations of their respective background sets. For additional detail, see 
the previous foot note. 
22
 Sen (1970, p.28) defines, A collective choice rule is a functional relation f such that for any set of n individual 
orderings 𝑅 ,   , 𝑅  (one ordering for each individual), one and only one social preference relation 𝑅 is 
determined, 𝑅    𝑅 ,   , 𝑅  . Italics in original. Note that if 𝑅 is restricted to being an ordering, this CCR is 
Arrow‟s (1951) social welfare function, the impossibility of existence Arrow proved, in one of the greatest insights 
of the 20
th
 Century. However, here in Sen‟s definition, he does not even require 𝑅 to be binary. Although Sen (1993) 
does prove Arrow‟s impossibility theorem by requiring 𝑅 to be only binary and reflexive, dropping altogether both 
of Arrow‟s additional restrictions, that 𝑅 is complete and transitive. This theorem is considerably more general than 
Arrow‟s impossibility theorem, because it shows the impossibility over a wider range of CCRs, though over the 
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By    ,   we denote the asymmetric part of 𝑅  ,   .We next turn to unanimity over a pair of 
alternatives under all possible variations of the background set to define Pareto preference. 
Definition 7A:    &  ,     [     𝑅 (  
 )  ] ↔   ?̂?  ,      . 
Definition 7B (weak Pareto rule):    &  ,     [       (  
 )  ] ↔    ̂  ,     . 
Remark: Definition 7A is a generalization of the Pareto ‘preference or indifference’ rule denoted 
by ?̂?  ,   to accommodate non-binary personal preferences over the set S of alternative social 
states, and similarly, Definition 7B is a generalization of the weak Pareto rule, denoted by 
 ̂  ,   . 
The weak Pareto rule in Definition 7B is an ethical principle. 
Definition 8: A social state x in S is Pareto optimal if and only if it is not Pareto dominated by 
any state y in S in accordance with Definition 7B. 
Finally, using Definitions 6, 7A and 7B, and by requiring that [  𝑅  ,     ] ↔ [  ?̂?  ,    ] and 
[     ,     ] ↔ [   ̂  ,    ], we can obtain a maximal social interaction outcome by using the 
following two lemmas. 
 LEMMA 4.1. ?̂?  ,    is a quasi-ordering of S. 
Proof: Following Sen (1970, Lemma 2*a, p.29)), 
   &   ,    , since by Definition 7A, for    ,      𝑅 (  
 )   , it follows that ?̂?  ,    is 
reflexive. 
Also, 
   ,  ,     [  ?̂?  ,      &    ?̂?  ,    ]  [   & {     𝑅 (  
 )   &   𝑅 (  
 )  }] 
          [     𝑅 (  
 )  ] 
   ?̂?  ,    .  ■   
Next, consider 
DEFINITION 9:   ?̂?,  ,      |    & ~[        ̂  ,     ]  is a Social Maximal Set. 
Remark: The social interaction maximal set of socially undominated elements of S with respect 
to the social quasi-ordering relation ?̂? is fully captured by Definition 9 with respect to the weak 
Pareto rule  ̂  ,   , which is the asymmetric part stated in Definition 7B.  
LEMMA 4.2.  The maximal set is non-empty for every finite set quasi-ordered by a non-binary 
preference ranking relation. 
Proof: Again, following Sen (1970, Lemma 1*b, p.11, and Sen (1997)), let      ,  ,    . 
Assign a real number      , and follow the recursive rule       ̂  ,                , 
and         otherwise, so that by construction,    is a maximal element.  ■ 
                                                                                                                                                             
same domain as Arrow‟s. This is also the most general formulation of Arrow‟s impossibility theorem to date. 
However, all I require 𝑅 to do is to generate a non-empty social maximal set, which I define presently.  
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Remark: Note that since    ,   ,      &   ≠    [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] & ~[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] are both 
admissible, personal preferences are non-binary, but this poses no problem for obtaining a 
nonempty social maximal set since the personal non-comparability of a pair of alternatives in    
is rendered irrelevant for defining the maximal set. This, of course, is not true of the social 
optimal set of best elements that is defined as  (?̂?,  ,  )    |    &         ?̂?  ,     , 
which is rendered empty by    ,   ,      &   ≠    [ 𝑅 (  
 ) ] & ~[ 𝑅 (  
 ) ]being  both 
admissible. 
Thus, requiring maximizing behavior as an act of volitional personal choice, instead of 
the more demanding optimization, does have an advantage in the case of non-comparability 
arising from non-binariness of personal preferences. In fact, it should not come as a surprise that 
once there is a social quasi-ordering which ranks at least one pair of alternatives, though not 
necessarily all such pairs, if and only if these two alternatives are comparable over all individuals 
and over all background sets, there must exist an element which is Pareto undominated and thus 
Pareto optimal. This follows from Zorn's lemma. 
In the case of personal choice theory, Sen (1997) exploits precisely this combination of 
non-binariness of preferences (and the entailed incomplete ranking), and maximizing behavior 
that precipitates the existence of a maximal element despite incompleteness. He thus obtains 
more general results than can be deduced from binary personal preferences that constitute a 
complete ordering and optimizing behavior that necessitates completeness for the existence of an 
optimal element – this is the formulation of standard rational choice theory. Sen‟s (1997) 
formalization is of a decision maker who has non-binary preferences. To obtain a nonempty 
social interactional set, rather than a nonempty personal maximal set, a group of finite n persons 
needs to be considered. For this case, based on Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, the following result is 
immediate. 
Theorem 4.1 (Existence of Socially Diverse Pareto Optimal State): Axioms N, Q and M are sufficient 
for the existence of a social state that is characterized by Conditions S and P. 
Proof:
23
 It is to be proved that for every set of non-binary personal preferences (𝑅 (  
 
), , 𝑅 (  
 
)) 
over a finite set S of alternative social states, where   ,   𝑅 (  
 
) is a quasi-ordering, there exists a 
nonempty maximal social interaction set  ?̂?,  ,    that contains at least one Pareto optimal state. 
 
                                                 
23
 The proof of Lemma 4.1, and therefore of Theorem 4.1, goes through if transitivity is weakened to Acyclicity:  
   ,    &    ,   ,  ,        [     (  
 )  &     (  
 )  ,  &       (  
 )   ]     𝑅(  
 )   , 
provided “quasi-ordering” is replaced by “reflexive and acyclic ranking.” These two may be called Lemma 4.1A and 
Theorem 4.1A, respectively. For further details, see Berdellima and Naqvi (2011). 
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By Lemma 4.1, the Pareto preference-or-indifference relation ?̂?  ,    is a quasi-ordering of the 
set S of alternative social states. And the Pareto-optimal subset of S is identical to the social 
maximal set   ?̂?,  ,   . Further, since S is finite, and ?̂?  ,    quasi-orders it, by Lemma 4.2, 
  ?̂?,  ,    is nonempty. Hence a non-binary personal preferences based social interaction 
outcome exists, and it is Pareto optimal. ■ 
Notice that, unlike the case of the existence of equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu exchange 
economy, and unlike the case of existence of Nash equilibrium, for my existence result I do not 
impose the requirement of completeness; in fact, I cannot impose it because incompleteness is 
entailed by non-binariness, if it is to have any cutting power at all. Nor indeed do I require 
preferences to be binary, as in Kelsey (1995). Moreover, moving from form to alternative 
interpretations of the background set, and by considering parametric variations of this set, many 
of the inadequacies in explanations of social and economic phenomena entailed by binariness are 
entirely jettisoned, replaced instead by a much more comprehensive and richer informational 
conceptual structure in which the unanimity property over a pair of alternatives, inherent in the 
weak Pareto rule, can still be defined. Also, the scope and reach of this non-binary model is so 
substantial that it also capable of formalizing some of the criticism of the game theory literature 
contained in Sen (1985). 
5. Existence of a Free Market Pareto Optimal State with Discrimination 
 Having demonstrated the existence of a Pareto optimal social state in an economy with 
non-binary personal preferences, a state that exhibits persons with endogenously diversified 
social identities, the next step is to show that injustice in the form of racial (or gender, caste, 
religious, and so on) discrimination that expresses itself as occupational segregation by social 
identity is consistent with this state. To show that such is indeed the case, I consider a special 
case of the production side of the model of Arrow and Debreu.  
Recall that Arrow and Debreu     ,   , 〈𝛼 , 𝜁 , 𝑅 (  
 )〉,     ,     defines the i
th
 
person. Let      Partition the   persons in the economy into two disjoint groups, 1, …,   , 
who belong to the set  , and are called Black, and have darker-color skin, and   +1, …   who 
belong to the set  and are called White, and have lighter-color skin. Thus there are two groups 
of persons in the economy:     ,    , 〈𝛼 , 𝜁 , 𝑅 (  
 )〉 and        ,  , 〈𝛼 , 𝜁 ,
𝑅 (  
 )〉. 
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Further partition   and  into two disjoint sets each,    and    and   and   such 
that     𝛼                &  𝛼              . I shall call a person 
who belongs to   an employer (because such persons own corporate shares) and a person who 
belongs to  , a potential employee or worker (since such persons have no income derived from 
corporate profits). Thus there are employers and workers of both races.  
Consider the special case of 𝜁   
 . Thus     𝜁   𝜁   , 𝜁  ,   ̅ , where 𝜁   and 𝜁   are 
non-negative endowments of commodities  , architectural design and  , gourmet dinner, and 
  ̅    is the endowment of labor of the i
th
 person.
24
 These quantities are flows per unit time. 
Every person engages in the production of architectural designs or gourmet dinners, and 
consumes architectural designs, gourmet dinners and leisure,   ̅   , where   is the number of 
hours per period that the person works in a firm, either in the architectural designs industry or the 
gourmet dinners industry. Since leisure is unspent labor, and a person cannot consume more than 
24 hours of leisure per day (nor, for that matter, provide more than 24 hours of labor per day), 
the i
th
 person‟s consumption vector        ,    ,     , is bounded from below by     
    ,    ,     , so that      .
25
 Only architectural designs and gourmet dinners are produced, and 
labor is a primary factor of production, as in Theorem 2 of Arrow and Debreu. 
 Employers consume all their leisure time (by assumption, their corporate income is 
sufficient for them to not work at all, and still consume all the architectural designs and gourmet 
dinners they want, as part of their respective maximal consumption sets, and only workers supply 
labor, again as part of their respective maximal consumption sets). 
In every firm in every industry, there are two employment categories: low-rank jobs that 
pay the economy-wide wage rate, and high-rank jobs for which employers pay a talent premium 
over and above the wage rate that they pay low-rank workers. The argument developed in the 
rest of this section is based entirely on Basu (2006). Following Basu (2006), I assume that the i
th
 
worker‟s production function is 
    
        ]  
      ,    ,       (1) 
                                                 
24
 For concreteness, we can consider   ̅     hours per day. 
25
 In particular,              ̅       . 
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if the worker produces commodity  , where a worker produces either architectural designs or 
graphic designs or gourmet dinners, but not both.
26
 Also,     ,  ,         is the output of 
commodity   per worker who puts in   hours of labor per period and is characterized by a 
parameter   [ ,  ], which is a positive integer with a finite upper bound  , where   is a 
worker‟s characteristic that is an indicator of talent of a worker (in terms of creativity or 
entrepreneurial spark to sign more contracts), with a higher value standing for greater talent, and 
which varies from one worker to another, but which  is not observable by any employer. 
 In (1),    is the proficiency of the i
th
 worker, such that       . Here,    is the second 
characteristic of a worker, though unlike talent, it is observable by employers, perhaps by the 
worker‟s educational attainment. The third characteristic of a worker, which is also observable 
by employers is   , which the worker‟s racial identity. Assume that     , , where   means 
that the worker is Black and  means the worker is White. 
 Since    does not figure in the production function (1), one might be tempted to conclude 
that racial distinctions will be inconsequential to the complexion of the equilibrium, but that 
would be an error. Race matters, however, as we shall see presently, because of the role played 
by  , in spite of the fact that talent and racial identity of a worker are, in fact, not linked. Thus,  
               
         
       ,     ,  .   (2) 
It is important to note the fact that the talent of a worker is independent of the worker‟s race, as 
is the worker‟s proficiency. I next specify four axioms to capture these ideas. 
Axiom PD: Proficiency distribution among Black and White workers is the same, but for a linear 
transform of population, and is observable to employers. 
Axiom TD: Talent distribution of Black and White workers is the same, but for a linear transform 
of population, but is unobservable to employers. 
Axiom C: In hiring a worker, all employers who compare profit-wise inconclusive Black and 
White workers, behave on the basis of the conjecture that White workers are more talented than 
Black workers. 
Axiom SM (Supermodularity): The higher the talent level   of a worker, the greater is worker‟s 
talent-induced productivity differential from one level to the next. That is,     ,   &      
   [ ,  ]                                  ,     . (3) 
                                                 
26
 I make the usual assumption that        , seen as a production function of labor h,  satisfies the Inada conditions, 
is homogenous of degree one in  , and exhibits positive but diminishing marginal product of labor hours  . 
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Next I specify a characteristic of a social state that refers to an unjust state as Condition J, 
and then prove the main result of the paper as Theorem 5.1  
Condition J (Violations of Justice): The social state is consistent with flagrant violation of justice 
that takes the form of segregation of most, though not all, Black persons in lower-ranked 
occupations with which are associated lower incomes, with simultaneous placement of White 
persons in higher-ranked occupations with higher incomes, regardless of the firms or the sectors 
in which they work. 
Theorem 5.1: Axioms N, Q, M, PD, TD, C and SM are sufficient for the existence of a social 
state that is characterized by Conditions S, P and J. 
Proof: From Theorem 6.1, N, Q and M   S and P. Thus it remains to prove that, in addition, 
PD, TD, C and SM  J also. 
The profit derived by a firm from employing the i
th
 worker in industry    ,   is 
         
         ,       (4) 
where employers are only interested in workers who do not earn a negative profit. Also, in (4), 
the employer is a price-taker in both commodity and factor markets. Therefore, the commodity 
price   , the hourly wage  , and the premium   that employers pay per unit of additional talent 
level (or contract signed with a new client) per period, to get a worker of higher talent   to work 
for them in higher-ranked occupations; these are all parametric for the firm.  
Substituting for the productions function (1) and (2) in (4), we have     ,  , 
               
              .     (5) 
Since the number of hours for which a worker is hired is a decision variable for each 
employer, the first order conditions for profit maximization are     , 
           
        ,     ,        (6) 
In (6),         
       is the marginal product of labor time of the ith worker in producing the 
j
th
 commodity, and from this it is possible to solve for  ̂ as a function of parameters   ,   ,   and 
 . I assume that  ̂   . I shall also assume, for simplicity, that every worker is hired for the same 
number of hours per day in both sectors, say eight hours per day, though nothing of consequence 
rests on this assumption. 
A limited liability clause in the employment contract would protect a worker from 
earning a negative profit, but not it will fail to protect the employer from incurring a loss, if the 
worker‟s talent level is sufficiently low. I assume this, as does Basu (2006). 
 Next, using (6),     ,  , define    from the zero profit condition as 
         ( ̂  )  
 
  
 
 
  
 ̂ . 
Also from (6), zero profit implies 
         ( ̂  )  
  
  
 
 
  
 ̂ 
from these two relationships it follows that 
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       [  ( ̂  )    ( ̂  )]  
 
  
 ,     (7) 
Similarly, define    as 
       [  ( ̂  )    ( ̂    )]  
 
  
 .     (8) 
The RHS of (7) and (8) are equal, but, due to the supermodularity property in Axiom SM, on the 
LHS we know that, 
     ( ̂  )    ( ̂    )    ( ̂  )    ( ̂  ). 
This implies that      . 
 Every worker with efficiency greater than    – whether Black or White – will get a high-
rank employment contract irrespective of the associated value of  , and earn   ̂    , because 
such a worker is guaranteed to turn a profit for the employer. However, no worker with 
efficiency less than    will get any high-rank employment contract, regardless of the associated 
value of  , because such a worker, if paid a talent premium, is bound to incur a loss for the 
employer.
27
 
The interesting case is of a worker whose efficiency is      
 ,     . In this case, for a 
given wage rate, depending upon the talent level of the worker, high-rank employment, which 
pays a talent premium, could lead to profit or loss for the employer – under a limited liability 
clause that applies to the worker, which I have assumed is the case. Since employers cannot 
observe the innate talent of a worker, in such a case they clearly have a dilemma. They must 
form a conjecture about a worker‟s talent. If employers – both Black and White – were to base 
their conjectures of a worker‟s talent on the racial identity of the worker, specifically on Axiom 
C, then they will offer high-rank employment contract to a worker if, and only if, the worker is 
White (    ), who will then earn   ̂    . 
This implies that Black workers with efficiency      
 ,      would not get high-rank 
employment, but it does not follow that they will be unemployed. Reconsider (5), but for    , 
which is the category of workers who are conjectured by employers to have no talent at all. 
Intersectoral labor mobility ensures that values of marginal product of such workers are equal in 
all industries, and their common value is the single, economy-wide wage rate of     workers, 
who get the low-rank employment contracts in general equilibrium. This wage rate  ̂ is 
determined endogenously by
28
 
          
                 
         ̂, 
where   is average efficiency of workers and    is aggregate employment of labor in industry 
   ,  . 
Thus, Black workers with efficiency       
 ,      would not be unemployed in general 
equilibrium. In fact, employers will offer a low-rank employment contract to a worker if, and 
only if, the worker is Black (     ), who will then earn  ̂ ̂. So, why will employers not decline 
offering contracts to Black workers with efficiency       
 ,     ? Simply because it is a simple 
                                                 
27
 Thus, since this economy lacks a safety net, only workers with efficiency greater than    will survive. 
Alternatively, if there is a state-sponsored safety net, then all persons with efficiency less than    will be dependent 
on the disability-welfare program, regardless of race. 
28
 While for a firm,   is a parameter, for the economy it is an endogenous variable. 
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profit-maximizing act for them to offer such workers a low-rank employment contract, with no 
talent premium, i.e.,    . Employers would be violating the simple profit maximization rule if 
they did not employ Black workers with efficiency       
 ,      in low-rank, low-income jobs. 
Hence the worst that can be done to such Black workers is to offer them low-rank contracts, 
which carry an income of  ̂ ̂, with  ̂, as noted above, being the labor market-clearing wage rate 
that is determined endogenously in general equilibrium. Thus an employer‟s dilemma is not 
whether or not to offer a contract to such Black workers. Rather, who should be offered a higher-
rank job contract and who should be offered a lower-rank one is the employers‟ dilemma. And 
this, they solve, along racial lines, so that the talent of White workers gets rewarded, but that of 
Black workers does not, if any of these workers efficiency falls between    and    . 
 Hence, employers – both Black and White – will sign contracts with White workers for 
high-rank occupations, in all firms in all industries. Similarly, employers – both Black and White 
– will sign contracts with Black workers for low-rank occupations, in all firms in all industries. 
There will thus emerge income inequality along racial lines, with White workers earning higher 
incomes,  ̂ ̂    ,     , than Black workers, who will earn income,  ̂ ̂.29 
Therefore, such a conjecture as Axiom C, along with the supermodularity axiom, will, in 
fact, become a self-fulfilling conjecture with support in general equilibrium, despite no actual 
link between talent and race or proficiency and race. An unjust occupational segregation by 
racial identity will hence be the stationary state outcome, and thereby the Pareto optimal social 
state will satisfy Condition J.  ■ 
  This theorem is unquestionably derisive of Pareto optimality as a principle worthy of 
pursuit on ethical grounds. Moreover, since such an unjust Pareto optimal outcome is the result 
of unrestrained, unregulated markets, the free-market ideology suffers a fatal blow, or loses its 
neocon luster, unless, of course, one favors the moral position that a person should be placed at a 
higher rank and paid a higher salary because of his or her gender, race, religion, ethnicity and the 
like, rather than rank and remuneration being based on merit. 
More profound is Basu‟s (2006) insight that there are actually multiple equilibria – some 
discriminatory, others not so – and it is possible to nudge or jolt an economy from a “bad” to a 
“good” equilibrium in some circumstances, but there are other circumstances, particularly if the 
nature of work performed is habit forming, in which more prolonged intervention that is external 
to the economy may be required for the removal of this injustice. It is not my purpose here to 
dwell on this matter, but the importance of Basu‟s (2006, 2010) examination of this issue must 
not be underestimated. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
As we can see, the Arrow Debreu model, modified by adding Axioms N and A, is a very 
rich and powerful model that is capable of precipitating a general equilibrium outcome that is 
                                                 
29
 This, of course, is the case with workers whose efficiency       ,     . All workers, both Black and White, will 
get high-rank jobs and earn higher incomes if their efficiency is greater that    . 
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endogenously characterized by differences in wealth holdings, which are also associated with 
socially distinct persons. Here, in summary form, I describe how I meet the attainable Arrowian 
standards of a theory of racial segregation, and the manner in which I rely on the work of Basu. 
In addition, I address some issues of conceptual and empirical nature. 
6.1 Arrow, Basu and the Proposed Theory 
Different employment categories within corporations were and are predominantly 
populated by persons of distinct races in the United States, but a credible theory that would 
explain this fact remains elusive despite the best efforts of economic theorists. This gap in 
economic theory was noticed and highlighted by Arrow (1998), who also set down four criteria 
and one specific suggestion, among other suggestions, for a credible theory of racial segregation 
by occupation within firms. These are: 
1. Employers should be treated as simple profit-maximizers 
2. Rational choice theory should characterize decision making by individuals 
3. Introduction of new variables should be avoided so keep it from becoming tautology 
4. Darwinian principles should not be neglected 
5. Direct social interaction and networks appear to be useful concepts.  
I provide in this paper what I believe to be a credible theory of racial discrimination that 
takes the form of segregation by occupation within firms. My theory meets Arrow‟s standards 
(1), (2) and (4) and (5), but it violates (3). I claim that (3) must be violated, otherwise all persons, 
without exception, would be perfect replicas of one another in terms of having the same social 
identity, and consequently no one would be able to know against whom to discriminate. This 
endogenous interpersonal homogeneity in an economy is an entailment of the restriction of 
binariness imposed on personal preference ranking relations. For the mere possibility of 
discrimination to arise as a phenomenon, it is necessary for the model of an economy to exhibit 
endogenous interpersonal heterogeneity, not homogeneity, of social identities. One way to 
achieve this is by the introduction of a new variable, to wit, a person‟s background set, on which 
the person‟s binary preference ranking relation is dependent, thereby rendering personal 
preferences (defined on the set of alternatives) non-binary in the Kanger-Sen sense.
30
 
Taking the lead from Basu (2006), I assume that workers have three characteristics, of 
which two can be observed by employers but the third cannot. Proficiency and race of a worker 
are observable, but the talent for creativity in signing more contracts with clients is not, though it 
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is bounded from above. If a worker‟s proficiency is at least as high as a critical value that even 
with no talent the worker would generate a positive profit if hired, then employers offer the 
worker, regardless of the worker‟s race, a high-rank job that pays a talent premium in addition to 
the general equilibrium economy-wide wage rate of those who are presumed to have no talent. 
On the other hand, if a worker‟s proficiency is so low that even the highest possible talent level 
would result in the employer‟s incurring a loss, the worker receives no job offer whatever.31 In 
the non-trivial intermediate-proficiency interval between the lower and higher critical values, 
employers face a dilemma because they have no way of knowing whether employing a particular 
worker is a profit-making or a loss-incurring proposition, arising from their incapability to 
discern a worker‟s talent level. Employers therefore do not know which worker in this 
intermediate-proficiency domain to offer a low-rank job that pays the equilibrium wage rate only 
and which worker to offer a high-rank job that also carries a talent premium. 
Employers seek resolution of this dilemma by basing their conjecture of a worker turning 
a profit on the worker‟s race, which is an observable characteristic. Specifically, if they 
conjecture that White workers are more talented than Black workers, there exists a general 
equilibrium in which White workers receive high-rank job offers while Black workers receive 
low-rank offers, provided workers‟ talent levels are characterized by the supermodularity 
property. This occurs despite both Black and White workers actually exhibiting the same 
distribution of both proficiency and talent. That‟s my complete theory. 
The force of Darwinian principles is muted because the combination of talent-level and 
proficiency of a worker makes for non-identically productive workers ex ante, among both 
Blacks and Whites. It is just that employers cannot observe the talent-level of a worker in either 
race. They do observe the proficiency and race of every worker. And the relative frequency 
distributions in population of proficiency, of talent, and inter alia of overall productivity of a 
worker in adding to profit income of employers, are all independent distributions. There is thus 
no pre-existing linkage between race and talent-level or between race and proficiency among 
workers. In such a set of circumstances, Darwinian forces do weed out certain expressions of 
collective racism, but they are unable to rule out racially segregated occupations within firms and 
other organizations. 
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Employers face a work force in which workers actually vary by profit-generating 
capability, but they cannot tell a profit-making worker apart from a loss-incurring worker in 
either race. The goal of the employers is solely to maximize profit. Yet the employer must 
determine which worker to offer a higher-paid high-rank job and which one to offer the lower-
paid low-rank job. They must then form a conjecture about which worker is which. Basu (2006) 
shows that under supermodularity of the talent levels, the conjecture of employers that Whites 
are more talented in signing profitable contracts with clients than are Blacks is a self-fulfilling 
conjecture, in some general equilibria. Ex post results a disparity in the Black workers getting 
stuck in low-rank jobs, which pay less, and White workers place in high-rank jobs, which are 
more lucrative. Of course, the super-proficient workers get high-rank jobs with high salaries 
regardless of race. But that is a tiny minority. 
Consequently, fractional claims to profit streams of different firms, as in owning 
corporate equity, would reflect a distribution in favor of Whites. Recalling that     , , , 𝛼  
is the  th person‟s vector of claims to profits of the   firms in the Arrow-Debreu model,  
   
                    
 
   &      
would be true ex post in a general equilibrium.
32
 
Further, rational choice as an act of non-binary preference maximization of a quasi-
ordered set of resource-constraint feasible alternatives characterizes every person. The set of 
alternatives is modified, however, by certain conjectures that have no actual basis ex ante in 
social reality and yet are powerful enough to shape social reality ex post.  By contrast, in Arrow 
and Debreu, individuals maximize a binary preference ranking relation that completely orders 
the set of alternatives.  
Replacing binary by non-binary personal preferences in the model of Arrow and Debreu 
is sufficient to retain individual-level rational choice foundations and to exhibit endogenous 
interpersonal diversity of social identity. This merely permits the possibility of racially 
segregated occupations within corporations in general equilibrium. It does not prove that a 
general equilibrium exhibits such discrimination. For that I employ the (1) supermodularity 
axiom on an unobserved worker characteristic and a (2) racist conjecture adopted by employers 
to aid them in the act of simple profit maximization. Together with the rest of the conditions, 
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these two assumptions drive the existence of a general equilibrium in which jobs within firms are 
racially segregated. 
Communities are networks. There is direct social interaction in that employers cannot 
help but observe every person‟s social identity and they take this into account in distinguishing 
the profit-producing from loss-incurring workers. Recall that this is despite any actual link 
between race and profit-generating capability of a person. 
6.2 Conceptual Departure: Non-Binary Preferences 
The upshot of Axiom N is to broaden the informational content of the definition of a 
person compared to that in contemporary economic theory, so that endogenous social identity 
differentiation of persons in an economy becomes possible as an entailment. Indeed, alternative 
approaches to characterizing a person (as a decision maker) in economic theory can be subjected 
to informational analysis, by examining each approach in terms of the types of information that it 
admits and the types it excludes. For example, Arrow and Debreu employ one definition of a 
person who acts as a decision maker in their economic theory. While the utility function they 
ascribe to a person is unique up to a positive monotonic transformation (ordinal measurability), 
Nash has a stricter characterization insofar as the utility function he assigns to a decision maker 
is unique up to a positive affine transformation (cardinal measurability). Naturally, the stronger 
the restrictions placed on the characterization of a person, the greater is the information rendered 
inadmissible in describing a person. In turn, narrower will be the variability of the characteristics 
of any given person, and thus greater the extent of homogeneity across distinct persons. 
On the non-binary relation I only impose the requirements of reflexivity and transitivity.
33
 
I retain the assumption of Arrow and Debreu that every person maximizes his or her own 
preference on the feasible set, which, as in their model, is a subset of the Euclidian space, except 
that I take this feasible set to be finite.
34
  
 For a certain class of problems in economic theory, the variation of social identity of 
persons in a group is inconsequential. An example is the existence result of Arrow and Debreu. 
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 Actually, acyclicity is sufficient, instead of transitivity, but it is not my purpose to produce the most general 
possible model, but merely to develop a model that can form the basis of an economic theory characterized by (a) 
the possibility of endogenous interpersonal social identity diversification, alongside (b) personal preference 
maximization, for which reflexivity and transitivity are sufficient, if the feasible set is finite.  
34
 This is also a simplifying assumption, made again because the purpose is not to achieve the greatest possible 
generality, but, instead, identity diversification and individual rational choice behavior. If this set is taken to be 
infinite, or indeed dense, then, in addition to reflexivity and transitivity, I would also have to impose the restriction 
of foundedness, but that would constitute a technical generalization, not one that leads to additional insight into the 
economic phenomenon under investigation here. 
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They seek a vector of positive commodity prices (in a unit simplex) at which aggregate demand 
equals aggregate supply for each commodity. For this aggregation, it is not material whether and 
how much demand for corn, say, comes from a Black male and how much from a White female, 
so that to identify each individual in a group by a binary preference ranking relation is quite 
legitimate. 
However, there are other problems addressed by economic theory, such as racial or 
gender discrimination, religious or tribal conflict, and equally important, ethnic or community 
cooperation, or variation in the nature of cooperation in organizations across countries, for which 
the social identity of a person, and thus the diversity of identities across persons in a groups, are 
intrinsically material to the phenomena under investigation. For examination of issues in which 
social identity diversity of persons is operationally significant, it follows from my impossibility 
result that the characterization of individuals by binary preferences must necessarily be 
abandoned in favor of non-binary preferences. In such a case, the practice of identifying an 
individual with a utility function representation of a binary preference relation must also be 
forsaken. 
I wish to emphasize that in my approach, preference, though non-binary, is construed 
strictly as fulfillment of desire or yearning in the well-being sense, rather than taken in the 
choice-behavioral sense, and I treat the maximization of this preference as one of the motivations 
that drives individual conduct. Sen (1994b and 1997) provides several contexts in which a person 
rationally maximizes one‟s own preference, while simultaneously violating the property of 
binariness of preferences.
35
  
6.3 Conceptual Departures: Positive Instrumental Value of Action Norms 
I depart from the implicit assumption in economic theory based on Nash and on Arrow 
and Debreu that the instrumental value of social norms is zero in influencing individual 
behavior.
36
 I replace this by the explicit assumption that there is a positive instrumental value 
(over and above the direct, constitutive value) of social norms in deliberately restricting an 
individual‟s instrumental possibilities further, so that the set of socially acceptable actions or 
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 Sen (1997, p. 477-478) mentions (i) reputation and indirect effects, (ii) social commitment and moral imperatives, 
(iii) direct welfare effects, and (iv) conventional rule following, as possible motivations for such behavior. And, in 
the same spirit, he also develops a Fruit Passing game with common knowledge of norms (p. 762). 
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 Most analysts, following Nash (1951), also adopt this as an implicit assumption in the game theory literature, 
although this has come under sharp criticism by Sen (1985), on which more presently. 
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strategies becomes a proper subset of the set of norms-independent feasible set of alternatives.
37
 
This may be called Action Norms Axiom, or Axiom A. Axiom C, which pertains to employers‟ 
conjecture that White workers are more talented than Black workers, is a special case of Axiom 
A. Non-binary personal preferences, Axiom N, and positive instrumental value of action norms in 
restricting individual instrumental possibilities are, Axiom A, new to economic theory. 
Axiom C is a special case of Axiom A, insofar as it gives specific content to one set of 
collective beliefs that effectively influence the character of the equilibrium outcome that exhibits 
members of one social group as more talented ex post than members of a distinct group, despite 
the absence of any link between talent and social identity ex ante. However, the specific content 
of Axiom A would not be Axiom C if an explanation of a different phenomenon – for example, 
intra-family wellbeing distribution or public debate and reasoning in national governance – 
involving heterogeneous social identities were the objective. The content of Axiom A is thus 
completely context dependent.
38
 
Axiom A relates to the functional, rather than intrinsic, value of norms. Indeed action 
norms do just this. They are social norms of conduct, with their own history and evolutionary 
paths, to which individuals feel obligated to conform, as requirements of membership of a 
community. Sen (1994a, p. 387) argues that if people follow, 
the Kantian requirements of action morality … “Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time 
will it to be universal law”, then “the people involved … could all end up having more fulfillment of their 
unmodified [personal well-being salient] preferences. … Obviously, confessing oneself is not such an act in 
the [unrepeated] prisoner‟s dilemma, since neither prisoner wants that behavior to be “universal.” The 
Smithian-Kantian self-imposed restraints differ from constraints given from outside. 
It is, of course, possible to translate the impact of instrumental constraints – even self-imposed ones – into 
reconstructed “objective functions” … But then the interpretation of the “objectives” would have to be 
correspondingly different … The crucial question is not whether the “maximizing format” can continue to 
work in the Smithian-Kantian case (it certainly can), but whether there are reasonable arguments that 
support self-imposition of action norms, with a deliberate restriction of instrumental possibilities.
39
 
Such norms can increase individual wellbeing (as in an escape from Prisoners‟ Dilemma 
by members of one community but not another) or worsen it for some persons (as in the outcome 
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 For example, its content would be Axiom   , that refers to collective beliefs that influence the ex post inequality in 
the distribution of wellbeing and freedoms among members of a family in a model of intra-family relationships, or it 
would be Axiom     that pertains to conjectures regarding cooperation in state governance by democracy via public 
discourse in some countries but not others,  among other context-dependent beliefs or conjectures. For example, 
Britain, post-WWII Germany, and some Scandinavian countries, among others, regularly exhibit public debate and 
reasoning in governance, but this not regularly evident in some other countries such as the United States, India, 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, to mention a few. 
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of discrimination), by deliberately restricting individual alternatives or strategies further, thereby 
making the socially acceptable set a proper subset of the norms-independent feasible set. That is 
the meaning of permitting the possibility of positive instrumental value of action norms, which I 
entertain as Axiom A, but which is taken to be zero in game theory and in the bulk of 
contemporary economic theory. 
6.4 Non-Binary Preferences and Influential Action Norms 
A Kanger-Sen non-binary preference ranking relation is sufficiently richer in terms of its 
information content that it can accommodate positive instrumental value of action norms (over 
and above their direct, constitutive value, which can form part of the goals themselves) in 
promoting or eroding unmodified individual wellbeing, in addition to its zero instrumental value, 
which is implicitly assumed in traditional economic theory. Therefore, Axiom A is not 
incompatible with Axiom N, and thus I engage in no logical hara-kiri in taking both axioms on 
board. 
Sen (1997) actually demonstrates two equivalent ways of modeling an individual who 
abides by social norms. One is maximizing a person‟s binary wellbeing-salient preference 
subject to self-imposed restraints, and the other is maximizing a person‟s non-binary ranking 
relation of wellbeing-salient preference, which is formally a binary relation that is conditional on 
the person‟s background set, as in late Stig Kanger‟s departure from binariness.40 Despite the 
equivalence that Sen establishes for a single individual, it is important to take note of the fact that 
for a collection of two or more persons this equivalence does not carry through. Thus, if the 
object is to gain a better understanding of racial discrimination, tribal conflict, and the like, the 
binary preference approach gets trumped by the non-binary one, because the former cannot 
endogenously distinguish conceptually between any two persons on the basis of their distinct 
social identities. 
Moreover, in economic theory every person is concerned solely with parametrically given 
prices in the market, and thus personal decision-making expresses itself as a person‟s direct 
interaction only with the market, not with other persons.
41
 Direct social interaction, between 
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 Arrow (1998) is clearly headed in this direction when he says (on p. 94), 
The theoretical picture of a market is one of impersonal exchange. … There is no particular relation 
between a supplier and a demander; that is, a supplier is indifferent about supplying one demander or 
another, and vice versa. … Certainly, employment of labor involves direct personal relations between 
employee and employer (or the latter's agents) as well as among employees. Similarly, credit relations … 
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persons with distinct social identities, is, therefore, completely absent in economic theory.
42
 It 
would also be helpful to have a formal theory of social interaction, which takes the form of 
interpersonal interaction among social beings with multiple community affiliations, in addition 
to each person‟s interaction with the Walrasian auctioneer, as in Arrow and Hahn (1971). Axiom 
N permits that, and Axiom A gives it teeth. Axiom C, which is a special case of Axiom A, induces 
talent differentiation among persons who are distinguished by social identity. 
While the talent of a worker is ex ante independent of the worker‟s social identity. 
However, the Basu-inspired Axiom C accomplishes a talent-based ex post differentiation of 
workers in the economy, into more talented and less talented workers, which is important 
because talent-induced productivity is the sole concern of firms that demand labor, because 
employers are simple profit maximizers, as in Arrow and Debreu, and as Arrow reminds us that 
any departure from this assumption “easily risks turning the “explanation” into a tautology.” 
Behavior based on such beliefs that have no innate basis in social reality can actually produce a 
social reality that vindicates those beliefs. This is the upshot of conjectural general equilibrium 
theory.
43
 
6.5 Community Membership and Obligation to not Violate Action Norms  
A person‟s identifying with or associating with distinct, though overlapping communities 
of other persons in society is not inconsequential. The collectivity of these others with whom we 
associate, due to one cause or another, with some of our social identities taking priority over 
others on different occasions, cannot but influence our own personal beliefs of what we believe 
to be reality, including, and especially social reality. What is more, the expressed values by 
                                                                                                                                                             
have typically required direct personal interaction between debtor and financial institution. … Let us ask 
whether a market-based model can broadly satisfy the[se] empirical constraints…. On the usual 
interpretation, it cannot. If the members of the two races, after adjusting for observable differences in 
human capital and the like, received different wages or were charged different prices in commodity or 
credit markets, an arbitrage possibility would be created which would be wiped out by competition. 
42
 When the auctioneer announces a finite vector of prices, agents make offers of supplies and demands for goods. If 
there is positive (negative) excess demand for a commodity in the aggregate, the auctioneer raises (lowers) the price 
of that commodity. On this see Arrow and Hahn (1971). Once such an iterative process leads to zero excess 
demands for all commodities, a Walrasian equilibrium is achieved, and only then do agents engage in trades at such 
prices. Agents in such an economy never really have any form of direct interaction, social or otherwise. 
43
 Seen from this perspective, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium arises if all agents have exclusively competitive 
conjectures viz., that market prices are parametrically external to their decisions, even though such conjectures are, 
in fact, false, simply because it is impossible to mathematically add up a finite number of demand curves of all the 
firms that produce a commodity to arrive at a downward sloping industry demand curve for that product. But, that 
poses no problem because, Hahn would argue, Arrow and Debreu show that there exists, under specified conditions, 
a general equilibrium in which such conjectures are vindicated. 
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others in the varied communities to which we belong colors our own notions of what is deemed 
sacred and what profane. Similarly, values of right and wrong, or of good and bad, lower or 
higher status, or what is or is not one‟s duty or obligation to do in a given circumstance, are 
operationally influenced solely because we belong to different communities. Association begets 
obligation. Obligation influences motivation. There are therefore three motivations that serve to 
rule out some elements of a person‟s feasible set as socially unacceptable individual behavior: (i) 
personal preference maximization subject to feasibility constraints and (ii) selecting, to a certain 
extent, a set of personal action-behavior norms from alternative sets of such norms, as restrictive 
obligations we are willing to abide by due to community affiliations, and (iii) some instrumental 
possibilities restricted by inexorable social identities of a person. Interpersonal interaction of 
such social creatures is social interaction. This relates to Sen‟s (1985, p. 345-346) claim that,  
If the recognition that we can all better pursue our respective goals by jointly departing from [our] goal 
priority makes us do exactly that, why should that departure change the nature of the [unmodified] goals 
that we are trying to pursue? … If taking everything into account, every member of a group does better in 
terms of the[ir] respective goals by following one type of behavior pattern rather than another, then that is a 
justification for the first pattern of behavior. 
This forms part of Sen‟s (1985) critique of the behavioral foundations of game theory. Neglect of 
this latter consideration of choice of behavioral norms by persons in society has impoverished 
economic theory and rendered it asocial. 
6.6 Forms of Expression of Racial Discrimination in the United States 
 Were it not for utter existential intolerance of any forms of social heterogeneity under the 
preference structure circumscribed by the restriction of binariness to every decision maker, 
including to consumption units in Arrow and Debreu or players in Nash, there would be no need 
to introduce any new variable. But the binariness property of preferences in their models is so 
inimical to social identity diversification that, in principle, for racial discrimination, or of any 
other conflict or cooperation to exhibit itself, it is necessary to introduce a new variable. I use 
𝑅     , as a non-binary relation of personal preference dependent on that person‟s background 
set, instead of only 𝑅  in Arrow-Debreu and in Nash, without the background set    that I 
include. 
The operational issue turns not on whether a new variable should be introduced (it 
certainly does have to be for social differentiation), but it critically hinges on what exactly should 
be the properties of the set,    called a person‟s background set in 𝑅     . In Arrow and Debreu 
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(1954) and in Nash (1951), for all persons or players,       ̅, turns out to be a special case of 
the Knager-Sen non-binary ranking relation 𝑅     . 
However, in the context of racial discrimination in the United States, for males,    
               and                    . This particular characterization of background 
sets would not apply at all if the interest were in examining gender discrimination, whether in the 
U.S., or elsewhere.
44
 Individual conjectures would also have to be correspondingly different, in 
terms of substantive content, pertaining to genders, rather than relating to racial differences. 
Notice that the consequences for life expectancy differences would still be biased in the same 
direction, in the distinct forms of racial and gender discrimination, caused by adverse social 
treatment of the aggrieved social group.  
In fact, employers imbibe values from the collective beliefs that embody prejudice 
against Blacks in the formation of their conjectures. Unfortunately, however, upon examination 
of the imbibed beliefs, the simple-profit maximizing employers would find that, due to the force 
of such pernicious beliefs in society, the prejudicial beliefs are vindicated. This is because by 
reducing the incentives for African Americans to engage in education, training and self-
improvement, they have ex post rendered vast numbers, though, of course, not all, of the African 
American community to actually exhibit lower productivity, thereby reinforcing the stereotype. 
After all, racial discrimination does manifest itself glaringly in terms of just shy of one-and-a-
half million missing African American males in early 21
st
 Century. It also expresses itself in 
terms of a 5 ½-year shorter life expectancy for African American males compared to White 
males in early 21
st
 Century.
45
 A higher incarceration rate of African Americans is another 
symptom of the prejudice against Blacks working through the social-economic-political system 
in the country, even today. Why would it not express itself also in terms of endogenous 
productivity differentials in the manner Basu (2006 and 2010) has suggested in a different 
context? 
6.7 Shift in Approach to Identity-inclusive Economic Theory 
The crucial point is that the „new variable‟, which is a person‟s background set, is 
dependent on the context of the issue under investigation. We ought not to look for some 
mathematical properties such as compactness or convexity, but rather treat background sets as 
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context-dependent. In explaining a specific social-interaction or political-interaction 
phenomenon, the specification of background sets that are relevant to the community affiliations 
of the persons involved must bear a closer proximity to reality, as must the collective beliefs or 
conjectures material to relationships between the related groups, for the model to have greater 
predictive power. Thus on the one hand identity variation among persons opens up another 
degree of freedom in modeling behavior, on the other it comes with the burden for an economic 
theorist to show more responsibility as a careful social anthropologist or a political scientist. This 
is thus not a field for tweaking an axiom here or there to get additional results, for they may have 
little or no value in explaining social and political phenomena that have an underlying economic 
foundation in non-binary individual rationality. 
Employers hire employees whose efficiency and talent are race-independent ex ante, but 
triggered by employers‟ conjectures, workers end up exhibiting non-identical race-based talent-
induced productivity levels. Since workers end up becoming productivity-wise non-identical 
along a racial divide, the Darwinian principle Arrow refers to loses much of its cutting power. 
I am actually advocating a move in the direction back from generality to particularity of 
modeling the specific phenomenon under investigation. In ascertaining aggregate demand for a 
commodity at any given price, it is irrelevant whether the demander is Black or White. Not so, 
however, if the object of investigation is racial discrimination versus ethnicity-based 
cooperation. The characterization of a person‟s background set is necessarily context dependent, 
and contexts happen to be particular and plural.
46
 
6.8 Identity and Violence 
To summarize the entire discussion, existing collective beliefs that effectively mediate 
personal wellbeing maximization as a volitional act of choice by each of a finite number of 
players, by deliberately limiting individual instrumentalities, taken together with representation 
of the maximand by a Kanger-Sen non-binary ranking relation that quasi-orders a belief-
independent feasible set of alternatives of choice, is the formal framework I present in this paper, 
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 This context-dependent background set in an analysis of racial discrimination in the United States is by no means 
the same as in the matter of gender discrimination in the world. The form it takes, the groups involved, the 
proportions of the population with distinct social identities, all vary greatly. Caste based conflict in India is another 
context completely distinct from both gender and racial discrimination, although all three, far too often, lead to the 
same disagreeable outcome, of making the lives of far too many persons considerably more morbid and shorter. In 
the pursuit of more and more general results in economic theory, we appear to have gone too far, in some respects, 
though not in all, in the direction of homogenizing persons by our assumptions to make our models incapable of 
addressing specific social injustices. Some back-tracking in the direction of context-dependent particularity seems to 
be necessary for addressing issues of specific social injustices and their remedies. 
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whether taken as an exchange model or with production as in Arrow and Debreu. This model is 
considerably richer in terms of the information that it deems admissible in the characterization of 
an individual member of a group. The replacement of a binary by a non-binary ranking relation 
precipitates the possibility of social identity diversification of individuals in the group with 
overlapping community affiliations, which is disallowed by binariness. 
Since each community affiliation obligates an individual to not violate specific types of 
action norms that the community deems unacceptable, individual instrumental possibilities 
become further restricted. By explicitly admitting the possibility that the instrumental value (over 
and above the constitutive value) of action norms is not zero – unlike the implicit assumption in 
contemporary economic theory that it is zero – collective beliefs begin to have some cutting 
power in translating personal preference maximization into exhibited behavior. In some 
instances, the role of collective beliefs may be to engender cooperation and thereby enhance 
every player‟s own unmodified wellbeing, as in an escape from the Prisoners‟ dilemma. In other 
instances, collective beliefs can support conflicts that are abhorrently unjust social outcomes, 
such as discrimination, shorter life spans of some members of a group for reasons that are extra-
biological and higher incarceration rates, to name a few. 
Linkages between wealth and social identity, with concomitant socio-economic and 
political-economic inequalities, come to life endogenously in society, and thereby provide a 
simple explanation of the capture of differential rents by ethnically, racially, or or other social-
identity based distinct groups of persons in an economy. 
Sen (2006) identifies the illusion of destiny of a person‟s unique identity that can breed 
hatred and violence, when fomenters of communal discord emphasize excessively such a 
solitary, divisive social identity of persons, inter alia devaluing a great many other social 
identities that the same persons actually share. Sen (2006) also argues that bloodshed need not, in 
fact, be the outcome if the spuriousness of this illusion of destined divisive identity is exposed 
through public discourse. He champions transparency and uninhibited public discourse in also 
serving to remove injustices of discrimination and killings inevitably inflicted by perpetrators of 
intolerance. I have tried in this paper to provide the outlines of a formal economic-theoretic 
framework in which these weighty matters can be discussed coherently. Much, of course, 
remains to be done, especially discovering how to make the removal of such injustices feasible. 
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Appendix 
Racial Discrimination in the United States 
 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, given the populations in thousands in the last two 
columns of Table 1 below, it follows that in 2009 there were 917 African American males per 
one thousand African American females. However, per one thousand White females, there were 
985 White males. Thus, there are 68 fewer African American males per 1,000 African American 
females than there are White males per 1,000 White females in the American population.  
Table 1 
1.5 million African American Males are Missing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Black males live 5 ½ years less than White males 
L. E. (years) Male Female 
Black 70.68 77.57 
White 76.19 81.21 
Life Expectancy: Black males – White males= -5.51 
Source: Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, USA, 2007 
 
To determine exactly how many Black males would have been alive if Black women‟s life 
expectancy achievement were also, counterfactually, as high as that of White women, see 
 
Table 3 
 
 
  Female(1000s) Male(1000s) M/F Ratio 
Black 21,808 19,996 917/1,000 
White 125,391 123,528 985/1,000 
B(M/F) - W(M/F) = -68/1,000 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 
Black Males =21,808,000 x 
 -0.068 = -1,483,000,000 
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As indicated in Table 1,47 since there were in 2009, in terms of thousands, 21,808 African 
American females, multiplying this by 68 gives 1.483 million, or almost 1.5 million missing 
African American males relative to the counterfactual case in which black males are as numerous 
relative to black females as white males are to white females.
48
 That they are fewer than they 
should be, can also be confirmed by the life expectancy figures for 2007 in Table 2: African 
American males are expected to live, on average, to the age of 71, White males to 76, African 
American females to 78, and White females to 81. On average, in the U.S., “Black males” live 5 
½ years less than do “White males.” Why? 
Anthropologists tell us that pure races are almost extinct: certainly in the U.S. in the first 
decade of the 21
st
 Century, due to genetic mixing over more than two centuries, the answer must 
be positioned not in the biological domain but in the field of social treatment received by Blacks 
versus Whites.
49
 This is an inescapable conclusion for this society at this time. 
Notice that there are three distinct types of injustice here, and almost 1.5 million 
additional African American males would be alive today if only one of these injustices were 
removed, viz., the consequence of adverse treatment suffered by Black males relative to Black 
females when compared with the biologically-determined ratio of male-to-female populations in 
the U.S. For more on this see Sen (1992). While I do not pursue this important line of 
investigation here, notice that this figure of 1.483 million missing Black males would turn out to 
be an underestimate if the second injustice suffered by Black females relative to White females 
were also removed. One rough measure of this number would be to consider how many more 
Black males would have been alive if Black females, counterfactually, were to have life 
expectancy as high as that of White females:                             million, as in 
Table 3. The third adjustment would arise from accommodation of the lower life expectancy of 
American White females relative to the best international standards of women‟s life expectancy, 
such as in Norway, which has consistently ranked among the very top countries in terms of the 
Human Development Index. 
   In the model I have proposed, there can be multiple equilibria supported by distinct 
rational conjectures in the manner of Basu (2010), thereby implying the existence of equilibria in 
which, ex post, African American males exhibit lower talent-induced productivity, lower life 
expectancy and lower peak-median income, not to mention a disgracefully higher incarceration 
rate that African Americans males suffer than do White males.  
                                                 
47
 For Life expectancy figures, see source: Table 103. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital 
Statistics Reports (NVSR), Deaths: Final Data for 2007 Vol. 58, No. 19, May 2010, at 
http://cdc.gov/NCHS/products/nvsr.htm#vol58/ . For population by race and gender, see 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0006.pdf. 
48
 These are Census Bureau figures, and they include those persons – Black and White, male and female – who are 
incarcerated. Moreover, consider the following counterfactual question. In the U.S., relative to females of the same 
race, if Black males were accorded equally favorable treatment as are White males, how many additional Black 
males would there be? Answer: one million, four hundred and eighty-three thousand additional Black males should 
have been alive, but are not. 
49
 The categories „Black‟ and „White‟ in reference to persons are human constructs, not innate in biological nature, 
so much so that the very definitions vary from country to country. In the U.S., a person is considered Black if she 
has one drop of „Black blood‟ whereas in Brazil a person is deemed White if she has one drop of „White blood‟. In 
South Africa there is a four-part classification in descending order of social valuation: Whites, Asian-Indians, 
Coloreds, and Blacks. Thus, most Whites in Brazil and all Coloreds in South Africa would be classified as Blacks in 
the U.S. 
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